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Abstract
Recent adversarial defense approaches have failed. Untargeted gradient-based
attacks cause classifiers to choose any wrong class. Our novel white-box defense
tricks untargeted attacks into becoming attacks targeted at designated target classes.
From these target classes, we can derive the real classes. Our Target Training
defense tricks the minimization at the core of untargeted, gradient-based adver-
sarial attacks: minimize the sum of (1) perturbation and (2) classifier adversarial
loss. Target Training changes the classifier minimally, and trains it with additional
duplicated points (at 0 distance) labeled with designated classes. These differently-
labeled duplicated samples minimize both terms (1) and (2) of the minimization,
steering attack convergence to samples of designated classes, from which cor-
rect classification is derived. Importantly, Target Training eliminates the need to
know the attack and the overhead of generating adversarial samples of attacks that
minimize perturbations. We obtain an 86.2% accuracy for CW-L2(κ=0) in CI-
FAR10, exceeding even unsecured classifier accuracy on non-adversarial samples.
Target Training presents a fundamental change in adversarial defense strategy.
1 Introduction
Neural network classifiers are vulnerable to malicious adversarial samples that appear indistinguish-
able from original samples [43], for example, an adversarial attack can make a traffic stop sign appear
like a speed limit sign [17] to a classifier. An adversarial sample created using one classifier can
also fool other classifiers [43, 5], even ones with different structure and parameters [43, 19, 37, 46].
This transferability of adversarial attacks [37] matters because it means that classifier access is
not necessary for attacks. The increasing deployment of neural network classifiers in security and
safety-critical domains such as traffic [17], autonomous driving [1], healthcare [18], and malware
detection [15] makes countering adversarial attacks important.
Gradient-based attacks use the classifier gradient to generate adversarial samples from non-adversarial
samples. Gradient-based attacks minimize at the same time classifier adversarial loss and perturba-
tion [43], though attacks can relax this minimization to allow for bigger perturbations, for example
Carlini&Wagner (CW) [11] for κ >0, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [28], FastGradientMethod
(FGSM) [19]. Other adversarial attacks include DeepFool [31], Zeroth order optimization (ZOO) [13],
Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP) [30].
Many recent proposed defenses have been broken [2, 8, 9, 10, 44]. They fall largely into these
categories: (1) adversarial sample detection, (2) gradient masking and obfuscation, (3) ensemble,
(4) customized loss. Detection defenses [29, 27, 26, 22] aim to detect, correct or reject adversarial
samples. Many detection defenses have been broken [10, 9, 44]. Gradient obfuscation is aimed at
preventing gradient-based attacks from access to the gradient and can be achieved by shattering
gradients [20, 47, 41], randomness [16, 26] or vanishing or exploding gradients [36, 42, 40]. Many
gradient obfuscation methods have also been successfully defeated [8, 2, 44]. Ensemble defenses [45,
47, 34, 41] have also been broken [8, 44], unable to outperform their best performing component.
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Customized attack losses defeat defenses [44] with customized losses [33, 47] but also, for example
ensembles [41]. Even though it has not been defeated, Adversarial Training [43, 24, 28] assumes that
the attack is known in advance and takes time to generate adversarial samples at every iteration. The
inability of recent defenses to counter adversarial attacks calls for new kinds of defensive approaches.
In this paper, we propose an adversarial defense that turns untargeted gradient-based attacks into
attacks targeted at designated classes. Then our defense derives correct classification from the
designated classes. Our Target Training defense is based on the minimization [43] at the core
of untargeted gradient-based attacks. Target Training minimizes both terms simultaneously - (1)
perturbation, and (2) classifier adversarial loss - by training the classifier with nearby points that
misclassify to designated classes. Thus, Target Training guides attacks to converge to adversarial
samples from designated classes. We adapt Target Training for attacks that exclude perturbation from
their minimization. Both approaches can be combined to defend against both types of attacks.
We make the following contributions:
• We develop Target Training - a novel, white-box adversarial defense that converts untargeted
gradient-based attacks into attacks targeted at designated, target classes, from which correct
classes are derived. Target Training is based on the minimization at the core of untargeted
gradient-based adversarial attacks.
• We eliminate the need to know the attack or to generate adversarial samples of a whole
category of attacks. We observe that for attacks that minimize perturbation, original samples
can be used instead of adversarial samples. Original samples have 0 perturbation from
themselves, the perturbation cannot be minimized further. We divide attacks into two
categories: attacks that minimize perturbation; and attacks that do not.
• Target Training surpasses default accuracy of 84.3% on non-adversarial samples in CIFAR10
for most attacks that minimize perturbation. We achieve: 86.2% for CW-L2(κ=0), 84.2%
for CW-L∞(κ=0), 86.6% for DeepFool, 89.0% for ZOO and 86.8% for UAP. For MNIST,
we achieve 96.6% for CW-L2(κ=0), 96.3% for CW-L∞(κ=0), 94.9% for DeepFool, 93.0%
for ZOO and 98.6% for UAP.
2 Related work
Here, we present the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks and defenses.
Notation A k-class, neural network classifier with θ parameters is denoted by function f(x) of input
x ∈ Rd that outputs y ∈ Rk , where d is the sample dimensionality and k is number of classes.
An adversarial sample is denoted by xadv. Standard k-class softmax cross-entropy loss function is
used to calculate the y classifier output viewed as a probability distribution, each yi denoting the
probability that the input belongs to class i, with 0 <= yi <= 1 and y1 + y2 + ... + yk = 1. At
inference, the highest probability class predicted C(x) = argmax
i
yi.
Distance metrics Adversarial attacks and defenses quantify similarity between images using norms as
distance metrics, for example L0 (not a real norm in the mathematical sense) - the number of pixels
changed in an image, L2 - the Euclidean distance, and L∞ - the maximum change to any pixel. Many
attacks and defenses are not limited to any one distance metric [11, 31, 30].
2.1 Adversarial attacks
The problem of generating adversarial samples was formulated by Szegedy et al. as a constrained
minimization of the perturbation under anLp norm, such that the classification of the perturbed sample
changes [43]. Because this formulation can be hard to solve, Szegedy et al. [43] did a reformulation
of the problem as a gradient-based, two-term minimization of the sum of the perturbation and the
classifier loss:
minimize c · ‖xadv − x‖22 + lossf (xadv, l)
subject to xadv ∈ [0, 1]n, (Minimization 1)
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where l is an adversarial label and c a constant. While term (1) ensures that the adversarial sample is
visibly close to the original sample, term (2) uses the classifier gradient to minimize classifier loss on
an adversarial label.
The Minimization 1 (page 2) is the foundation for gradient-based attacks, with tweaks leading to
different attacks. Attack methods can use different kinds ofLp norms for term (1), for example the CW
attack [11] uses L0, L2 and L∞. Some attacks do not minimize the distance from original samples,
leading to adversarial samples farther from original samples. For example, the L∞ FGSM attack by
GoodFellow et al. [19] aims to generate adversarial samples fast and far from original samples based
on an  parameter that determines perturbation magnitude: xadv = x+  · sign(∇xloss(θ, x, y)).
The current strongest attack, CW [11], changes the basic Minimization 1 by passing the c parameter
to the second term and using it to tune the relative importance of the terms. CW also introduces a
confidence parameter into its minimization for the confidence of the adversarial samples. High values
of confidence push CW to find adversarial samples with higher confidence that no longer minimize
perturbation. With a further change of variable, CW obtains an unconstrained minimization problem
that allows it to optimize directly through back-propagation.
Implicitly following Minimization 1, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. define adversarial perturbation as the
minimal perturbation sufficient to cause misclassification in DeepFool [31]. DeepFool’s algorithm
uses the gradient to approximate linear classifier boundaries and to calculate the smallest perturbation
as the smallest distance to the boundaries.
Black-box attacks Black-box attacks encompass attacks that assume no access to classifier gradients.
Such attacks with access to output class probabilities are called score-based attacks, for example the
ZOO attack [13], a black-box variant of CW [11]. Attacks that assume access to only the final class
label decision of the classifier are called decision-based attacks, for example the Boundary [6] and
the HopSkipJumpAttack [12] attacks.
Multi-step attacks Attack perturbation can be calculated in more than one step. UAP [30] finds
only one universal perturbation by iterating several times over the training samples to find the
minimal perturbation to move to the classifier boundary. UAP aggregates all perturbations into a
universal perturbation. The BIM attack [24] extends FGSM [19] by applying it iteratively with
a smaller step α. The PGD attack [28] is an iterative method with an α parameter for step-size
perturbation magnitude. PGD starts at a random point x0, projects the perturbation on an Lp-ball
B of a specified radius at each iteration, and clips the adversarial sample values: x(j + 1) =
ProjB(x(j) + α · sign(∇xloss(θ, x(j), y)).
2.2 Adversarial defenses
Szegedy et al. used Adversarial Training [43, 24, 28] defense to populate low probability blind
spots with adversarial samples labelled correctly. Adversarial Training is one of the few non-broken
defenses. Its drawback is that it needs to know the attack in advance and to train the classifier with
adversarial samples of the attack.
Detection defenses Such defenses aim to detect, then correct or reject adversarial samples. So far,
adversarial samples have defied detection efforts as many detection defenses have been defeated, for
example ten diverse detection methods (other network, PCA, statistical properties) by attack loss
customization in [9]; attack customization against [22] by Hu et al. in [44]; attack transferability [10]
against MagNet [29]; deep feature adversaries [39] against [38] by Roth et al.
Gradient masking and obfuscation Many defenses that mask or obfuscate the classifier gradient that
gradient-based attacks rely on have been defeated [8, 2]. Athalye et al. [2] identify three types of
gradient obfuscation: (1) Shattered gradients - incorrect gradients caused by non-differentiable com-
ponents or numerical instability, for example [20] by Guo et al. with multiple input transformations.
Athalye et al. compute the backward pass with a function approximation that is differentiable using
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation [2]. (2) Stochastic gradients in randomized defenses
are overcome with Expectation Over Transformation [3] by Athalye et al. Examples of this defense
are Stochastic Activation Pruning [16] which drops layer neurons based on a weighted distribution
and [48] by Xie et al. which adds a randomized layer to the input of the classifier. (3) Vanishing
or exploding gradients are used, for example, in Defensive Distillation (DD) [36] which reduces
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the amplitude of gradients of the loss function, PixelDefend [42], Defense-GAN [40]. Vanishing or
exploding gradients are broken with parameters that avoid vanishing or exploding gradients [8].
Complex defenses Defenses combining several defeated approaches, for example Li et al. [26] using
detection, randomization, multiple models and losses, can be defeated by focusing on the main
defense components [44]. [47, 34, 41] are defeated ensemble defenses combined with numerical
instability [47] or regularization [34] or mixed precision on weights and activations [41]. [4] uses a
Fourier transform to compress inputs, [33] by Pang et al. proposes a new loss function but is defeated
with a customized loss in the attack.
Summary Many defense approaches have been broken. They mainly focus on changing the classifier.
Instead, our defense focuses on changing how attacks behave, with minimal changes to the classifier.
Target Training is the first defense that is based on the Minimization 1 at the core of untargeted
gradient-based adversarial attacks.
3 Target Training
Target Training eliminates the need to know the attack or to generate adversarial samples of attacks
that minimize perturbation. Our defense turns untargeted attacks into attacks targeted at designated
target classes, then derives correct classification. Target Training undermines Minimization 1 (on
page 2) of gradient-based adversarial attacks by training the classifier with exactly the points that
attacks look for: nearby points (at 0 distance) that minimize adversarial loss. For attacks that relax
the minimization by removing the perturbation from it, we adjust Target Training.
Target Training defends by training a classifier so that attacks converge to adversarial samples of
designated classes. Untargeted gradient-based attacks are based on Minimization 1 of the sum of (1)
perturbation and (2) classifier adversarial loss. Target Training trains the classifier with samples of
designated classes that minimize both terms of the minimization at the same time, turning untargeted
attacks into attacks targeted at designated target classes. From the designated classes, derivation of
correct classification is straightforward.
Here, we give the intuition for categorizing adversarial attacks into: attacks that minimize pertur-
bation; and attacks that do not minimize perturbation. For attacks that minimize perturbation, the
minimization of term (1) perturbation allows Target Training to completely eliminate the need for
knowledge about the attacks or using their adversarial samples in training. Term (1) minimization is
reached at original samples because they have 0 perturbation from themselves. In attacks that do not
minimize perturbation, Target Training needs adversarial samples during training to minimize term
(1) perturbation of generated adversarial samples.
For Target Training, it is important to cause attacks to minimize both terms of Minimization 1
simultaneously at samples from designated classes. Following, we outline how Target Training
minimizes term (1) perturbation for each category of attacks, and how it minimizes term (2) classifier
adversarial loss. Further, we explain how Target Training approaches for both categories of attack
can be combined together.
Minimization term (1) - perturbation Against attacks that minimize perturbation, such as CW-L2
(κ = 0), CW-L∞(κ = 0) and DeepFool, Target Training uses duplicates of original samples in each
batch instead of adversarial samples, since no other points can have smaller distance from original
samples than the original samples themselves. This removes completely the need and overhead of
calculating adversarial samples against all attacks of this type. Having reduced term (1) perturbation
to 0, the minimization reduces to term (2) only. Algorithm 1 shows classifier training against attacks
that minimize perturbations.
Against attacks that do not minimize perturbation, such as CW-L2(κ > 0), PGD and FGSM, Tar-
get Training adjusts by training with additional adversarial samples from the attack. The adjusted
Algorithm 2 is shown in Appendix A.
Term (2) of the minimization - classifier adversarial loss Let us imagine that Minimization 1 of
gradient-based attacks only had term (2). If this were just classifier loss without the adversarial
requirement, attacks would converge to samples from the class with the highest probability, the real
class. The reason is that the real class minimizes loss in a classifier that has converged. Since term (2)
minimizes classifier adversarial loss, attacks would converge to the class with the second highest
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Algorithm 1: Target Training of classifier N against attacks that minimize perturbation.
Result: Target-trained classifier N
1 Size of the training batch is m, number of classes in the dataset is k;
2 Initialize network N with double number of output classes, 2k, keep all else in N the same;
3 repeat
4 Read random batch B = {x1, ..., xm} and its ground truth G = {y1, ..., ym};
5 Duplicate batch B. The new batch is B′ = {x1, ..., xm, x1, ..., xm};
6 Duplicate the ground truth and increase ground truth values by k. The ground truth becomes
G′ = {y1, ..., ym, y1 + k, ..., ym + k};
7 Do one training step of network N using batch B′ and ground truth G′;
8 until training converged;
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Figure 1: Target Training with and without adversarial samples, and output probabilities at inference.
Example images are from the MNIST dataset, smaller batch size shown for brevity. Inference output
probability values for MNIST and CIFAR10 images are shown in Appendix C, Table 5 and Table 6.
probability - any of the adversarial classes with the highest probability. In a normal multi-class
classifier, only the first highest probability is distinguished from the rest - a value close to 1 for the
true-label class. The rest of the classes have ∼ 0 probability value without any distinction between
them. If we could control which classes have the the top two highest probability classes, we could
control the minimization of term (2).
Figure 1 shows that as a result of training with batches with additional samples that are assigned to
designated target classes, the classifier has two high probability output classes at inference: original
class and designated class. Since attacks minimize classifier adversarial loss, attacks converge to
adversarial samples from the designated class in order to minimize term (2) of Minimization 1. The
same samples also minimize term (1) since designated classes were assigned to duplicated original
samples in training. As a result, attacks converge to adversarial samples from the designated classes.
Model structure and inference The only change to classifier structure is doubling the number of output
classes from k to 2k. The loss function remains standard softmax cross entropy. Target Training has
no norm limitation because it minimizes the perturbation to 0, which translates to Lp norms of 0, for
any p. For example, Target Training defends against CW-L2 as well as CW-L∞ attacks. Inference
calculation is: C(x) = argmax
i
(yi + yi+k), i ∈ [0 . . . (k − 1)].
5
3.1 Simultaneous defense against both categories of attack
Target Training can be extended to counter at the same time attacks that minimize perturbations
and attacks that do not. An example would be to defend against attacks that minimize perturbation,
and the CW-L2(κ = 40) attack which does not minimize perturbation. To counter both at the same
time, Target Training would triple, instead of duplicate, the batch. One set of extra samples would
be original samples. The other set of extra samples would be CW-L2(κ = 40) adversarial samples.
For the labels, there would be two sets of designated classes: one set for the convergence of attacks
that minimize perturbation, and the other one for the convergence of the CW-L2(κ = 40) attack. At
inference, the correct class would be: C(x) = argmax
i
(yi + yi+k + yi+2·k), i ∈ [0 . . . (k − 1)].
This could be extended even further to accommodate more attacks that do not minimize perturbation.
4 Experiments and results
Our Target Training defense leverages the fact that some attacks minimize perturbation. To counter
these attacks, we replace adversarial samples with original samples because they have perturbation 0
from themselves. Target Training does not use adversarial samples against attacks that minimize
perturbation, but uses them against attacks that do not minimize perturbation. As a result, we conduct
a separate set of experiments for each type of attack.
Threat model We assume that the adversary goal is to generate adversarial samples that cause
untargeted misclassification. We perform white-box evaluations, assuming the adversary has complete
knowledge of the classifier and how the defense works. In terms of capabilities, we assume that the
adversary is gradient-based, has access to the CIFAR10 and MNIST image domains and is able to
manipulate pixels. For attacks that minimize perturbations, no adversarial samples are used in training
and no further assumption is made about attacks. For attacks that do not minimize perturbations, we
assume that the attack is of the same kind as the attack used to generate the adversarial samples used
during training. Further, we assume that perturbations are Lp-constrained.
Attack parameters For CW, 1, 000 iterations by default but we run experiments with up to 100, 000
iterations, confidence values are 0 or 40. For PGD, we use the same attack parameters as Madry et al.
in [28]. For MNIST, there are 40 steps of size 0.01, and  = 0.3. For CIFAR10, there are 7 steps of
size 2, and  = 8. For ZOO attack, we use parameters specified in the ZOO attack paper [13], 1000
and 3000 iterations for CIFAR10 and MNIST, initial constant value is 0.01, 200 adversarial samples
selected randomly from the testing images of CIFAR10 and MNIST. For FGSM,  = 0.3, as in [28].
Datasets MNIST [25] and CIFAR10 [23] are 10-class datasets used throughout previous work.
MNIST [25] has 60K, 28× 28× 1 digit images. CIFAR10 [23] has 70K, 32× 32× 3 images. All
evaluations are with testing samples.
Classifier models We purposefully do not use high capacity models, such as ResNet [21], to show that
Target Training does not necessitate high model capacity. The architectures of MNIST and CIFAR
datasets are shown in Appendix C, Table 3. No data augmentation used. We achieve 99.1% for
MNIST and 84.3% for CIFAR10.
Tools We generate adversarial samples with CleverHans 3.0.1 [35] for the CW [11], DeepFool [31],
and FGSM [19] attacks and the IBM Adversarial Robustness 360 Toolbox (ART) toolbox 1.2 [32]
for the other attacks. Target Training is written in Python 3.7.3, using Keras 2.2.4 [14].
4.1 Target Training without adversarial samples against attacks that minimize perturbation
Target Training counters adversarial attacks that minimize perturbation without using adversarial
samples. The non-broken Adversarial Training defense cannot be used here because it cannot work
without adversarial samples. We use an unsecured classifier as baseline because other defenses have
been defeated [10, 9, 8, 2, 44] successfully.
Table 1 shows that Target Training exceeds by far accuracies by unsecured classifier on adversarial
samples in both CIFAR10 and MNIST. Target Training defends against attacks that minimize
perturbation without prior knowledge of such attacks and without using their adversarial samples. In
CIFAR10, Target Training exceeds even the accuracy of the unsecured classifier on non-adversarial
samples (84.3%) for most attacks. Against the ZOO black-box attack, Target Training defense
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Table 1: Target Training defends against attacks that minimize perturbations without using adversarial
samples. In addition, Target Training exceeds the baseline by far, and even the accuracy of unsecured
classifier on non-adversarial samples in CIFAR10. Target Training defends against attacks of different
norms, against black-box attacks, and does not decrease performance for attacks with more iterations.
CIFAR10 (84.3%) MNIST (99.1%)
Target Unsecured Target Unsecur.
Attack Training Classifier Training Classif.
CW-L2, κ = 0, iterations=1K 85.6% 8.8% 96.3% 0.8%
CW-L2, κ = 0, iterations=10K 86.1% 8.7% 96.6% 0.8%
CW-L2, κ = 0, iterations=100K 86.2% 8.9% 96.6% 0.8%
CW-L∞, κ = 0, iterations=1K 84.2% 42.0% 96.3% 82.1%
DeepFool 86.6% 9.2% 94.9% 1.3%
ZOO 89.0% 81.5% 93.0% 96.0%
UAP 86.8% 17.24% 98.6% 42.1%
maintains its performance. Target Training defends against attacks of different norms, for example
L2 and L∞. Finally, Target Training improves accuracy when the attack runs more iterations. With
CW-L2 attack iterations from 1K-100K, accuracy increases for CIFAR10 from 85.6% to 86.2%, for
MNIST from 96.3% to 96.6%.
4.2 Target Training against adversarial attacks that do not minimize perturbation
Against adversarial attacks that do not minimize perturbation, Target Training uses adversarial
samples and performs slightly better than Adversarial Training. We choose Adversarial Training
as a baseline because it is a non-broken adversarial defense, more details in Related work. Our
implementation of Adversarial Training is based on [24] by Kurakin et al., shown in Algorithm 3 in
Appendix B.
Table 7 in Appendix C shows that Target Training defends against attacks that do not minimize
perturbation, exceeding by far accuracies of the unsecured classifier. Furthermore, Target Training
performs slightly better than Adversarial Training against these attacks. Target Training achieves
accuracies starting from 72.1% in CIFAR10, and 91.7% for MNIST. In addition, Target Training
defends against multi-step attacks, in this case the PGD attack.
4.3 Summary of results
With our experiments in Section 4.1, we show that we substantially improve performance against
attacks that minimize perturbation without using adversarial samples. In Section 4.2, we show that at
the same time, Target Training maintains performance againt attacks that do not minimize perturbation,
compared to previous non-broken defense. Target Training can combine both approaches and defend
simultaneously against both types of attack, as we describe in Section 3.1.
4.4 Transferability analysis
For a defense to be strong, we need to show that it breaks the transferability of attacks [7]. A good
source of adversarial samples for transferability is the unsecured classifier. We experiment on the
transferability of attacks from the unsecured classifier to a classifier secured with Target Training.
Importantly, Table 2 shows that Target Training breaks the transferability of adversarial samples
generated by attacks that do not minimize perturbation: CW-L2(κ = 0), CW-L∞(κ = 0) and
DeepFool. Target Training maintains high accuracies in CIFAR10 and MNIST against adversarial
samples generated with the unsecured classifier.
Against attacks that do not minimize perturbation, CW-L2(κ = 40) and PGD, Target Training breaks
the transferability of attacks for MNIST but not for CIFAR10. This indicates that we might need to
look for samples that minimize perturbation better against this category of attacks.
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Table 2: Target Training breaks the transferability of attacks from the unsecured classifier by main-
taining high accuracy against attacks generated using the unsecured classifier in attacks that minimize
perturbation. For attacks that do not minimize perturbation, Target Training breaks the transferability
in MNIST only.
CIFAR10 (84.3%) MNIST (99.1%)
Target Unsecured Target Unsecured
Attack Training Classifier Training Classifier
CW-L2(κ = 0), iterations=1K 69.9% 8.8% 78.3% 0.8%
CW-L∞(κ = 0), iterations=1K 76.6% 42.0% 93.5% 82.1%
DeepFool 74.8% 9.2% 96.5% 1.3%
CW-L2(κ = 40), iterations=1K 34.7% 8.5% 95.1% 0.7%
PGD 36.8% 32.7% 92.2% 79.7%
4.5 Adaptive evaluation
Many recent defenses have failed to anticipate attacks that have defeated them [7, 9, 2]. To avoid that,
we perform an adaptive evaluation [7, 44] of our Target Training defense.
What attack could defeat the Target Training defense? Attacks that are either targeted or not gradient-
based, both outside the threat model. Most current attacks, including the strongest ones, CW and
PGD, are gradient-based. Finding adversarial samples without the gradient is a hard problem [43].
Could Target Training be defeated by methods used to break other defenses? Attack approaches [10,
9, 8, 2, 44] used to defeat most current defenses cannot break Target Training defense because we
use none of the previous defenses, such as: adversarial sample detection, preprocessing, obfuscation
(shattered, vanishing or exploding gradients, or randomization), ensemble, customized loss, subcom-
ponent, non-differentiable component, or special model layers. We also keep the loss function simple
- standard softmax cross-entropy and no additional loss.
Iterative attacks decrease Target Training accuracy more than single-step attacks, which suggests that
our defense is working correctly [7]. Target Training defends against black-box ZOO attack, which
means that we are not doing gradient masking or obfuscation [7]. Non-transferability of attacks
also points to non-masking. Increasing iterations for CW-L2(κ = 0) 100-fold from 1K to 100K
increases the defense accuracy. In CIFAR10 accuracy increases from 85.6% to 86.2%, in MNIST
from 96.3% to 96.6%. This is explained by the fact that Target Training tricks attacks into designated
classes. Target Training also maintains performance on original samples, as shown in Appendix C,
Table 4. We will release the code and trained models upon acceptance.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Target Training presents a fundamental shift in adversarial defense in two ways. First, our defense is
the only defense able to convert untargeted gradient-based attacks to attacks targeted at designated
classes. From the designated classes, correct classification is derived. Second, Target Training
eliminates the need to know the attack in advance, and the overhead of adversarial samples, for
attacks that minimize perturbation. In contrast, the previous non-broken Adversarial Training defense
needs to know the attack and to generate adversarial samples of the attack during training. This is a
limitation because in real applications, the attack might not be known.
Target Training achieves high accuracy against adversarial samples and breaks the transferability of
adversarial attacks. We achieve even better accuracy than 84.3% accuracy of unsecured classifier
on non-adversarial samples in CIFAR10. For example, 86.2% for CW-L2(κ = 0), 84.2% for CW-
L∞(κ = 0), 86.6% for DeepFool, 89.0% for ZOO and 86.8% for UAP. We show that Target Training
breaks the transferability of adversarial samples in attacks that minimize perturbation. Target Training
also breaks the transferability of adversarial samples in attacks that do not minimize perturbation in
MNIST. Target Training also maintains performance on original, non-adversarial samples.
In conclusion, we show that Target Training succeeds by switching the focus from changing the
classifier to changing indirectly how attacks behave.
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Broader impact
Machine learning solutions in general, and neural network classifiers in particular, are increasingly
being deployed into safety-critical domains, for example self-driving cars. If attacks on such applica-
tions are possible, this impacts the safety of the systems that deploy them and the people that use
them. Therefore, it is crucial to have neural network classifiers that are robust to adversarial attacks.
References
[1] Dario Amodei, Chris Olah, Jacob Steinhardt, Paul F. Christiano, John Schulman, and Dan Mané. Concrete
problems in AI safety. CoRR, abs/1606.06565, 2016.
[2] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of security:
Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00420, 2018.
[3] Anish Athalye, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, and Kevin Kwok. Synthesizing robust adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07397, 2017.
[4] Mitali Bafna, Jack Murtagh, and Nikhil Vyas. Thwarting adversarial examples: An l_0-robust sparse
fourier transform. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 10075–10085, 2018.
[5] Battista Biggio, Igino Corona, Davide Maiorca, Blaine Nelson, Nedim Šrndic´, Pavel Laskov, Giorgio
Giacinto, and Fabio Roli. Evasion attacks against machine learning at test time. In Joint European
conference on machine learning and knowledge discovery in databases, pages 387–402. Springer, 2013.
[6] Wieland Brendel, Jonas Rauber, and Matthias Bethge. Decision-based adversarial attacks: Reliable attacks
against black-box machine learning models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.04248, 2017.
[7] Nicholas Carlini, Anish Athalye, Nicolas Papernot, Wieland Brendel, Jonas Rauber, Dimitris Tsipras, Ian
Goodfellow, Aleksander Madry, and Alexey Kurakin. On evaluating adversarial robustness. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1902.06705, 2019.
[8] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Defensive distillation is not robust to adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1607.04311, 2016.
[9] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Adversarial examples are not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection
methods. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security, pages 3–14.
ACM, 2017.
[10] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Magnet and" efficient defenses against adversarial attacks" are not
robust to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.08478, 2017.
[11] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. In 2017 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
[12] Jianbo Chen, Michael I Jordan, and Martin J Wainwright. Hopskipjumpattack: A query-efficient decision-
based attack. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.02144, 3, 2019.
[13] Pin-Yu Chen, Huan Zhang, Yash Sharma, Jinfeng Yi, and Cho-Jui Hsieh. Zoo: Zeroth order optimization
based black-box attacks to deep neural networks without training substitute models. In Proceedings of the
10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security, pages 15–26. ACM, 2017.
[14] François Chollet et al. Keras. https://keras.io, 2015.
[15] Zhihua Cui, Fei Xue, Xingjuan Cai, Yang Cao, Gai-ge Wang, and Jinjun Chen. Detection of malicious
code variants based on deep learning. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 14(7):3187–3196,
2018.
[16] Guneet S Dhillon, Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Zachary C Lipton, Jeremy Bernstein, Jean Kossaifi, Aran
Khanna, and Anima Anandkumar. Stochastic activation pruning for robust adversarial defense. In
International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
[17] Kevin Eykholt, Ivan Evtimov, Earlence Fernandes, Bo Li, Amir Rahmati, Chaowei Xiao, Atul Prakash,
Tadayoshi Kohno, and Dawn Song. Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 1625–1634,
2018.
[18] Oliver Faust, Yuki Hagiwara, Tan Jen Hong, Oh Shu Lih, and U Rajendra Acharya. Deep learning for
healthcare applications based on physiological signals: a review. Computer methods and programs in
biomedicine, 2018.
[19] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[20] Chuan Guo, Mayank Rana, Moustapha Cisse, and Laurens Van Der Maaten. Countering adversarial images
using input transformations. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
[21] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition.
In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages 770–778, 2016.
[22] Shengyuan Hu, Tao Yu, Chuan Guo, Wei-Lun Chao, and Kilian Q Weinberger. A new defense against
adversarial images: Turning a weakness into a strength. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 1633–1644, 2019.
9
[23] Alex Krizhevsky, Vinod Nair, and Geoffrey Hinton. Cifar-10 and cifar-100 datasets. URl: https://www. cs.
toronto. edu/kriz/cifar. html, 6, 2009.
[24] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Adversarial machine learning at scale. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1611.01236, 2016.
[25] Yann LeCun, Corinna Cortes, and Christopher JC Burges. The mnist database of handwritten digits, 1998.
URL http://yann. lecun. com/exdb/mnist, 10:34, 1998.
[26] Yingzhen Li, John Bradshaw, and Yash Sharma. Are generative classifiers more robust to adversarial
attacks? In International Conference on Machine Learning, 2019.
[27] Xingjun Ma, Bo Li, Yisen Wang, Sarah M Erfani, Sudanthi Wijewickrema, Grant Schoenebeck, Dawn
Song, Michael E Houle, and James Bailey. Characterizing adversarial subspaces using local intrinsic
dimensionality. In International Conference on Machine Learning, 2018.
[28] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. Towards
deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.
[29] Dongyu Meng and Hao Chen. Magnet: a two-pronged defense against adversarial examples. In Proceedings
of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 135–147. ACM,
2017.
[30] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, Omar Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. Universal adver-
sarial perturbations. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition,
pages 1765–1773, 2017.
[31] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. Deepfool: a simple and accurate
method to fool deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and
pattern recognition, pages 2574–2582, 2016.
[32] Maria-Irina Nicolae, Mathieu Sinn, Minh Ngoc Tran, Beat Buesser, Ambrish Rawat, Martin Wistuba,
Valentina Zantedeschi, Nathalie Baracaldo, Bryant Chen, Heiko Ludwig, Ian Molloy, and Ben Edwards.
Adversarial robustness toolbox v1.0.1. CoRR, 1807.01069, 2018.
[33] Tianyu Pang, Kun Xu, Yinpeng Dong, Chao Du, Ning Chen, and Jun Zhu. Rethinking softmax cross-
entropy loss for adversarial robustness. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2020.
[34] Tianyu Pang, Kun Xu, Chao Du, Ning Chen, and Jun Zhu. Improving adversarial robustness via promoting
ensemble diversity. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2019.
[35] Nicolas Papernot, Fartash Faghri, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Reuben Feinman, Alexey Kurakin,
Cihang Xie, Yash Sharma, Tom Brown, Aurko Roy, Alexander Matyasko, Vahid Behzadan, Karen
Hambardzumyan, Zhishuai Zhang, Yi-Lin Juang, Zhi Li, Ryan Sheatsley, Abhibhav Garg, Jonathan Uesato,
Willi Gierke, Yinpeng Dong, David Berthelot, Paul Hendricks, Jonas Rauber, and Rujun Long. Technical
report on the cleverhans v2.1.0 adversarial examples library. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768, 2018.
[36] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram Swami. Distillation as a defense
to adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks. In 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP), pages 582–597. IEEE, 2016.
[37] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick D. McDaniel, and Ian J. Goodfellow. Transferability in machine learning: from
phenomena to black-box attacks using adversarial samples. CoRR, abs/1605.07277, 2016.
[38] Kevin Roth, Yannic Kilcher, and Thomas Hofmann. The odds are odd: A statistical test for detecting
adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.04818, 2019.
[39] Sara Sabour, Yanshuai Cao, Fartash Faghri, and David J Fleet. Adversarial manipulation of deep represen-
tations. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2016.
[40] Pouya Samangouei, Maya Kabkab, and Rama Chellappa. Defense-gan: Protecting classifiers against
adversarial attacks using generative models. In International Conference on Learning Representations,
2018.
[41] Sanchari Sen, Balaraman Ravindran, and Anand Raghunathan. Empir: Ensembles of mixed precision deep
networks for increased robustness against adversarial attacks. In International Conference on Machine
Learning, 2020.
[42] Yang Song, Taesup Kim, Sebastian Nowozin, Stefano Ermon, and Nate Kushman. Pixeldefend: Leveraging
generative models to understand and defend against adversarial examples. In International Conference on
Learning Representations, 2018.
[43] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian J. Goodfellow,
and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In International Conference on Learning
Representations, 2013.
[44] Florian Tramer, Nicholas Carlini, Wieland Brendel, and Aleksander Madry. On adaptive attacks to
adversarial example defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.08347, 2020.
[45] Florian Tramèr, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Dan Boneh, and Patrick McDaniel.
Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07204, 2017.
[46] Florian Tramèr, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Dan Boneh, and Patrick McDaniel. The space of
transferable adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.03453, 2017.
10
[47] Gunjan Verma and Ananthram Swami. Error correcting output codes improve probability estimation and
adversarial robustness of deep neural networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
pages 8643–8653, 2019.
[48] Cihang Xie, Jianyu Wang, Zhishuai Zhang, Zhou Ren, and Alan Yuille. Mitigating adversarial effects
through randomization. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
Appendix A Target Training algorithm against attacks that do not minimize
perturbation
Algorithm 2: Target Training of classifier N using adversarial samples.
Result: Target-Trained classifier N
1 Size of the training batch is m, number of classes in the dataset is k;
2 Initialize network N with 2k output classes;
3 ATTACK is an adversarial attack;
4 repeat
5 Read random batch B = {x1, ..., xm} with ground truth G = {y1, ..., ym} from training set;
6 Generate adversarial samples A = ATTACK(B) using current state of N ;
7 The new batch is B′ = B
⋃
A = {x1, ..., xm, x1adv, ..., xmadv};
8 Duplicate the ground truth and increase the duplicate values by k. The ground truth becomes
G′ = {y1, ..., ym, y1 + k, ..., ym + k};
9 Do one training step of network N using batch B′ and ground truth G′;
10 until training converged;
Appendix B Adversarial Training algorithm we use for comparison
Algorithm 3: Adversarial Training of classifier N using adversarial samples.
Result: Adversarially-Trained network N
1 Size of the training batch is m, number of classes in the dataset is k;
2 Initialize network N with k output classes;
3 repeat
4 Read random batch B = {x1, ..., xm} with ground truth G = {y1, ..., ym} from training set;
5 Generate adversarial samples {x1adv, ..., xmadv} from batch using current state of N ;
6 Make new batch B′ = {x1, ..., xm, x1adv, ..., xmadv};
7 Make new ground truth G′ = {y1, ..., ym, y1, ..., ym};
8 Do one training step of network N using batch B′ and ground truth G′;
9 until training converged;
11
Appendix C Additional tables
Table 3: Architectures of Target Training classifiers for CIFAR10 and MNIST datasets. For the
convolutional layers, we use L2 kernel regularizer. Notice that the final Dense.Softmax layers in both
models have 20 output classes, twice the number of dataset classes. The default, unsecured classifiers
have the same architectures, except the final layers have 10 output classes: Dense.Softmax 10.
CIFAR10 MNIST
Conv.ELU 3x3x32 Conv.ReLU 3x3x32
BatchNorm BatchNorm
Conv.ELU 3x3x32 Conv.ReLU 3x3x64
BatchNorm BatchNorm
MaxPool 2x2 MaxPool 2x2
Dropout 0.2 Dropout 0.25
Conv.ELU 3x3x64 Dense 128
BatchNorm Dropout 0.5
Conv.ELU 3x3x64 Dense.Softmax 20
BatchNorm
MaxPool 2x2
Dropout 0.3
Conv.ELU 3x3x128
BatchNorm
Conv.ELU 3x3x128
BatchNorm
MaxPool 2x2
Dropout 0.4
Dense.Softmax 20
Table 4: Comparing Target Training and Adversarial Training accuracy on original samples. Adver-
sarial Training is not applicable (NA) in the first row because it needs adversarial samples.
CIFAR10 (84.3%) MNIST (99.1)
Target Advers. No Target Advers. No
Train- Train- Defe- Train- Train- Defe-
Adv. samples in training ing ing nse ing ing nse
none (against attacks w/o perturb.) 86.7% NA 84.3% 98.6% NA 84.3%
CW-L2 (κ = 40) 77.7% 77.4% 84.3% 98.0% 98.0% 99.1%
PGD 76.3% 76.9% 84.3% 98.3% 98.4% 99.1%
FGSM( = 0.3) 77.6% 76.6% 84.3% 98.6% 98.6% 99.1%
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Table 5: Class output probabilities for Target Training on original, and adversarial samples from
MNIST. Adversarial samples generated with CW-L2(κ = 0). Zero probability values and probability
values rounded to zero have been omitted.
Original images
Labels
0 0.508
1 0.435
2 0.616
3 0.776
4 0.754
5 0.622
6 0.652
7 0.614
8 0.524
9 0.430
10 0.492
11 0.565
12 0.384
13 0.224
14 0.246
15 0.378
16 0.348
17 0.386
18 0.476
19 0.570
Adversarial images
Labels
0 0.500
1 0.503
2 0.493
3 0.492
4 0.500
5 0.500
6 0.499
7 0.457
8 0.500
9 0.505
10 0.500
11 0.497
12 0.507
13 0.508
14 0.500
15 0.500
16 0.501
17 0.543
18 0.500
19 0.495
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Table 6: Class output probabilities for Target Training on original, and adversarial samples from CI-
FAR10. Adversarial samples generated with CW-L2(κ = 0). Zero probability values and probability
values rounded to zero have been omitted. The two highest class probabilities for each image are
made bold. The deer (fifth image) appears to be misclassified as a horse.
Original images
Labels
air- auto- bird cat deer dog frog horse ship truck
plane mobile
0 0.405 0.002
1 0.455
2 0.007 0.562
3 0.602 0.004
4 0.083
5 0.006 0.482
6 0.527
7 0.387 0.556
8 0.537
9 0.004 0.471
10 0.583 0.002
11 0.545
12 0.005 0.434
13 0.398 0.005
14 0.056
15 0.006 0.518
16 0.473
17 0.453 0.444
18 0.455
19 0.004 0.529
Adversarial images
Labels
air- auto- bird cat deer dog frog horse ship truck
plane mobile
0 0.491 0.005
1 0.544
2 0.012 0.492
3 0.470 0.004
4 0.078
5 0.007 0.511
6 0.478
7 0.435 0.490
8 0.457
9 0.002 0.503
10 0.486 0.004
11 0.456
12 0.009 0.499
13 0.528 0.005
14 0.054
15 0.007 0.488
16 0.522
17 0.408 0.510
18 0.539
19 0.002 0.497
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Table 7: Target Training performs slightly better than Adversarial Training against attacks that do not
minimize perturbation, both utilizing adversarial samples in training. We also compare with unsecured
classifier performance. Further results in Appendix C, Table 8 show that both Target Training and
Adversarial Training provide defense against some attacks they have not been trained for, but not all.
CIFAR10 (84.3%) MNIST (99.1%)
Adv. samples Target Adv. Unsec- Target Adv. Unsec-
in training Adv. samples Train- Train- ured Train- Train- ured
(TT and AT) in testing ing ing Classif. ing ing Classif.
CW-L2(κ = 40) CW-L2(κ = 40) 77.7% 77.4% 8.5% 98.0% 98.0% 0.7%
PGD PGD 76.3% 76.2% 32.7% 92.3% 91.7% 79.7%
FGSM( = 0.3) FGSM( = 0.3) 72.1% 71.8% 11.8% 98.0% 98.4% 10.0%
Table 8: Expanded comparison of Target Training and Adversarial Training against attacks that do
not minimize perturbation. Here, we show also performance against attacks, the adversarial samples
of which have not been used in training. Both Target Training and Adversarial Training defend
against some attacks that they have not been trained for, but not all. We also compare with unsecured
classifier performance.
CIFAR10 (84.3%) MNIST (99.1%)
Adv. samples Target Advers. No Target Advers. No
in training Adv. samples Train- Train- Defe- Train- Train- Defe-
(TT and AT) in testing ing ing nse ing ing nse
CW-L2 (κ = 40) 77.7% 77.4% 8.5% 98.0% 98.0% 0.7%
CW-L2 (κ = 0) 71.3% 12.3% 8.8% 97.4% 1.5% 8.8%
CW-L2 DeepFool 75.8% 13.2% 9.2% 97.6% 1.6% 1.3%
(conf=40) PGD 10.0% 10.0% 32.7% 23.3% 2.9% 79.7%
FGSM( = 0.3) 10.6% 9.9% 11.8% 56.6% 15.8% 10.0%
FGSM( = 0.01) 48.9% 36.4% 40.4% 97.7% 97.8% 98.6%
PGD 76.3% 76.2% 32.7% 92.3% 91.7% 79.7%
CW-L2 (κ = 40) 7.3% 57.3% 8.5% 83.2% 98.4% 0.7%
PGD CW-L2 (κ = 0) 12.8% 12.7% 8.8% 94.3% 22.7% 8.8%
DeepFool 15.0% 13.0% 9.2% 86.5% 4.7% 1.3%
FGSM( = 0.3) 10.7% 10.2% 11.8% 79.9% 95.4% 10.0%
FGSM( = 0.01) 39.8% 41.5% 40.4% 98.2% 98.4% 98.6%
FGSM( = 0.3) 72.1% 71.8% 11.8% 98.0% 98.4% 10.0%
FGSM( = 0.01) 40.8% 42.1% 40.4% 98.5% 98.5% 98.6%
FGSM CW-L2 (κ = 40) 49.9% 74.2% 8.5% 58.8% 1.1% 0.7%
( = 0.3) CW-L2 (κ = 0) 12.5% 12.7% 8.8% 51.8% 1.1% 8.8%
DeepFool 12.7% 12.8% 9.2% 48.3% 1.2% 1.3%
PGD 17.2% 1.2% 32.7% 72.6% 42.5% 79.7%
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